Mu and Varadharajan proposed an electronic voting scheme and claimed that their scheme authenticate the voters, protect the anonymity of them, and detect the identity of double voters. Due to some weaknesses in MuVaradharajan scheme, several modified schemes have been proposed by Lin et al., Hwang et al., Rodriguez-Henriquez et al. and Asaar et al.; however this paper shows that these schemes suffer from some weaknesses in fulfilling the pointed properties. For this purpose, we get Hwang et al. scheme as a case study and apply our new attack on it. Also we consider the applicability of the attacks on other pointed schemes. In addition, we present a new scheme and show that the scheme resists against the proposed attacks without loosing efficiency.
Introduction
By the need of democracy in developing human societies and by developing communication networks and internet, it is necessary to produce new secure e-voting schemes that satisfy some requirements such as anonymity of voters, unforgeability of tickets and perceptibility of double voters.
Electronic voting protocols could be classified by their approach into three categories: 1) blind signature based electronic voting schemes [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] ; 2) homomorphic encryption based electronic voting schemes [5] , [6] ; 3) electronic voting schemes which use randomization such as the schemes which employ mixnets [7] , [8] . One of the first voting protocols which is based on blind signature and used to claim that it could protect voter's anonymity, authenticate the voters and detect the identity of double voters, is proposed by Mu and Varadharajan [9] . They also claimed that their scheme is suitable for large scale elections. In 2003, Chien et al. [10] showed that there are some weaknesses in security of Mu-Varadharajan's schemes such as identifying the owner of a cast ballot by authorities, imperceptibility of double voting and forgeablity of a ballot by anyone without being authenticated. In 2003 Lin et al. [11] proposed an improvement on Mu and Varadharajan's protocol. They have tried to improve the weakness that voters could successfully vote more than once without being detected. Their proposed scheme does not require any special voting channel and it is claimed that the scheme is able to detect vote duplicity effectively. Yang et al. in 2004 [12] proposed another improvement on Mu and Varadharajan's protocol. Although their scheme is resistant to the attacks which has been proposed in [10] , it can not determine the identity of double voter. Hwang et al. in 2005 represented an attack on Lin et al. protocol in [13] . They also showed that the modification of Lin et al. allows the authentication server to identify the voters of published tickets so that voters will lose their privacy. Hwang proposed a new scheme to solve this problem and thus enhance the security [13] . It was claimed that the protocol satisfies the privacy of voters and detects double voting. In 2008 Asaar et al. [14] showed that the Hwang et al. scheme has the weakness that eligible voter with a valid ticket could vote more than once without being detected. They also proposed a new improvement on it. However it is possible to show that their improvement has the same weaknesses as the weaknesses which are proposed in this paper. Furthermore in 2007 F. Rodriguez-Henriquez et al. [15] proposed another improvement over the Mu and Varadharajan e-voting protocol which suffers from the same problem as Hwang et al. scheme. Moreover, in 2008 Asaar et al. [16] proposed another scheme based on Lin et al. scheme. Although, their scheme resist against the proposed attacks in [10] , it is vulnerable to some attacks which are presented in section 2.2.
In this paper first we review Hwang et al. scheme and its failures in section 2. Then in section 3 we propose a new modified scheme to solve the weaknesses of the former schemes and show that the new scheme won't be affected by the proposed attack without losing efficiency and requirement of the former one. The conclusion is presented in section 4.
Hwang et al. scheme and its failures
In this section first we describe the protocol proposed by Hwang et al. in subsection 2.1. Then in subsection 2.2 we present some attacks on anonymity of voter, unforgeability of ticket and perceptibility of double vote in this scheme. The applicability of these attacks to some other schemes on the race of Mu-Varadharajan scheme are parented.
Hwang et al. scheme
The Hwang et al.'s anonymous electronic voting scheme consists of the following participants: Voters (V ), an Authentication Server (AS), Voting Servers (V S), a Ticket Counting Server (T CS), and a Certificate Authority (CA). For convenience, some necessary notation are defined below:
• (e x , n x ), d x : the RSA public/private key pair of participant x.
• Cert x : the public-key certificate of participant x, which is signed by CA.
• p: a large prime number, which is a public system parameter.
• g, h: are two different elements in Z * p which are also public system parameters.
• : the operation of concatenation.
• t: timestamp. and two random numbers k 1 and r in Z * p . Then, V computes w 1 , w 1 , w 2 and w 2 as follow:
Then, the voter sends {V, AS, Cert V , t, w 1 , w 1 , w 2 , w 2 , ((
AS first verifies the validity of the certificate and timestamp, then validate the signature ((w 1 w 1 w 2 w 2 t) d V )mod n V . After passing all verifications, AS chooses a unique random number k 2 and computes:
Where a 1 = g r , a 2 = h r , y 1 = g k 1 +k 2 , and y 2 = h 2k 1 +k 2 . Then, the messages {AS, V, w 3 , (w 4 w 5 w 6 w 7 t) e V modn V } are delivered to V . Note that AS also stores k 2 along with V 's identity in it's database. (c) V obtains k 2 by decrypting w 3 . Thus, V can calculate y 1 and y 2 by using g, h, k 1 and k 2 . Furthermore, V also computes the signatures s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 by removing the blinding factors b 1 and b 2 from w 4 , w 5 , w 6 and w 7 as follow:
(d) V applies the ElGamal digital signature scheme [17] to sign the voting content m. Let x 1 = k 1 + k 2 and x 2 = 2k 1 + k 2 be the private keys of ElGamal digital signature and y 1 , y 2 be the corresponding public keys such that y 1 = g k 1 +k 2 mod p and y 2 = h 2k 1 +k 2 mod p. V generates two signature (a 1 , s 5 ) and (a 2 , s 6 ) of the voting content m by using the following equations:
Then the voting ticket can be computed as T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m} 2.1.2. The voting and tickets collecting phase (a) V sends the voting ticket T to V S. (b) V S validates a 1 , a 2 , y 1 , and y 2 by checking the following equations:
If all of the above equations hold, V S further verifies the signatures (a 1 , y 1 , s 5 ) and (a 2 , y 2 , s 6 ) of the voting content m by checking the following equations:
If both verifications succeed, V S stores T in its database.
(c) After the voting time expired, VS sends all the collected tickets to T CS.
The tickets counting phase
Upon receiving all tickets from the Voting Servers, T CS first verifies if there are double voting tickets by checking y 1 , y 2 , a 1 and a 2 for every ticket to see whether they have been repetitively used. If these parameters appear in more than one ticket, the owner of this ticket has voted twice or more. Moreover, if the voter uses the same parameters to sign different voting contents, T CS and AS can cooperate to find the malicious voter as follows. Assume that T CS discovers a voter using the same parameters y 1 , y 2 , a 1 and a 2 to sign two different voting contents m and m . Then T CS can calculate
Finally, T CS can identify the malicious voter by searching AS's database to find out which voter is associated with the unique random number k 2 . Then the T CS publishes the valid tickets and counts them.
Weaknesses of this scheme
In this subsection we present some attacks on Hwang et al. scheme and show that the scheme is vulnerable to the claimed properties (i.e. anonymity of voter, unforgeability of tickets and perceptibility of double voter). Furthermore applicability of these attacks on other schemes of the family of Mu-Varadharajan scheme are shown in table 1.
The attacks on anonymity of voter
First attack. In this scheme since parameters w 1 and w 1 are blinded with the same blinding factor, when the voter sends {V , AS, Cert V , t, w 1 ,
h r for the voter and store it beside the identity of him. On the other hand at the end of voting process, when T CS publishes tickets AS can compute the value z 2 = a 1 a 2 = g r h r for each ticket which is published by ticket counting server. By matching the values of z 1 and z 2 , AS can determine the owner of each vote m.
Since, Assar et al. [14] has similar structure to this scheme, the attack can also be employed on theie scheme. However, since Lin et al. scheme [11] , Assar et al. scheme [16] and Rodriguez-Henriquez et al. [15] , have used different blinding factors in different equations, computing the value similar to z 1 is impossible and this attack can not be employed on them.
Second attack. Suppose that T CS has published all cast tickets. In order to find the owner of the ticket T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m}, AS can perform the following procedure to identify the owner of this ticket:
1. AS select a record {V , k 2 } from its own database and computes the value r as follow:
If the equation a 1 ? = g r holds then r = r and V is the owner of this ticket; else AS chooses another record from its own data base and compute the equation (8) while the owner of this vote is determined. 2. This step is done while the owner of all tickets are determined.
This attack can be employed on [11] , [16] , [13] , [14] and [15] in similar ways.
The attacks on unforgeability of tickets
Finally the forged duplicate ticket would be T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m}. This ticket is passed through all validations which will be done:
mod n AS (10) This attack can be employed on [14] in a similar way. Furthermore by using one generator g instead of two generator g and h, this attack can be employed on [11] , [16] and [13] in a similar way. However since in [15] the computations are done in different interconnected modules, while computation of multiplications, we can not forge new valid ticket similar to this scheme.
Second attack. Two malicious voters whose tickets are T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m} and T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m } can collude and make the forged ticket T = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 a 1 a 2 y 1 y 2 m } as follow:
This thicket is passed through the validation of the protocol. In [15] since the computations are done in different modules, while computation of divisions,we can not forge new valid ticket similar to this scheme. However by using one generator g instead of two generator g and h, this attack can be employed on [11] , [16] , [13] , and [15] in a similar way. Furthermore this attack can be obtained on [14] .
Third attack. A malicious voter can exchange the values of a 1 , s 1 with y 1 , s 3 respectively and compute new values for s 5 as s 5 
. By these changes he will be able to produce new forged ticket which passes the validations of the protocol. In a similar way by exchanging the values of a 2 , s 2 with y 2 , s 4 respectively and computing new value for s 6 as s 6 = r −1 .(my 2 − (2k 1 + k 2 )) mod (p − 1) he can produce another forged ticket. Also by simultaneously applying the mentioned changes he can produce another forged ticket.
Moreover since the exchanging the sequence of the parameters in a valid ticket, is not checked in [14] , [11] , [16] , [13] , and [15] , This attack can be employed on them in a similar way.
The attack on perceptibility of double voter
In the scheme, it is supposed that the voter is trusted to choose exponents in the form described in equation (1) . However, a malicious voter can deviate from this form, choose other value for k 1 such as k 1 and compute the value of
and fulfill the process of acquiring a valid ticket. In this situation, if a malicious voter votes more than once, T CS will not be able to determine the identity of him.
In Hwang scheme since the voter is trusted to choose exponent on the generators g and h in his share of the keys in the prescribed manner, this attack is applicable on it. The similar situations are held in [14] . However since the schemes [11] , [16] , [13] , and [15] use only one generator g instead of two generators g and h, and consequently there is no assumption on the exponents of the generators which the voters must be trusted to obey them. So the attack is not applicable on them. 
The new electronic voting scheme
In the new scheme in order to get vulnerability to the first and second attacks on unforgeability of tickets, multiplicative structure of the keys in the signatures is replaced by additive structure and the generators g and h are chosen in a way that the discrete logarithm of them be unknown. Furthermore, in previous schemes the malicious voter can choose exponents in such way that no authority could trace him if double voting occurs. In order to protect the scheme against the third attack on unforgeability of tickets, we allowed the voter to choose exponent as he desire and by introducing new key structure, the perceptibility of double voting is satisfied. In addition, in the new scheme by effectively blinding the signatures of AS and increasing the number of unknown parameters, our new scheme resists the attacks on anonymity of voter.
Our proposed scheme
Our proposed scheme also has composed of three phases of the former scheme. Before starting the protocol, voters must get their certificate from certificate authority. Let Z * p be a multiplicative group such that solving discrete logarithm problem in it is hard. Furthermore suppose that q be a large prime number such that q|p − 1. In our scheme the certificate authority chooses a generator g of order q for multiplicative group Z * p and stores it beside the other information in voter's certificate.
Voting and ticket obtaining phase
Before starting this phase certificate authority chooses a generator h of order q in Z * p for authentication server and publishes it. Then the following steps are done: (a) A voter V chooses three blinding factors b 1 , b 2 and b 3 as well as two random numbers r 1 and r 2 such that r 1 , r 2 < q/2. Then, V computes w 1 , w 2 and w 3 by the following equations:
mod n AS (12) After that, the voter sends {V , AS, Cert V , t, w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , ((w 1 w 2 w 3 t)
AS first verifies the validity of the timestamp t and the certificate Cert V and then by using the certificate it verify the signature ((w 1 w 2 w 3 t) d V ) mod n V }. If all verifications are successful, AS chooses k i , k j ∈ Z * q such that k i , k j < q/2 randomly and computes k 2 = k i + k j in a way that k 2 is a fresh value and has not been already used and computes:
Where a 1 = g r 1 , a 2 = h r 2 , y 1 = g r 1 +k i , and y 2 = h r 2 +k j . Then, AS delivers the messages {AS, V, w 4 , t, (w 5 w 6 t) e V mod n V } to V . Note that AS also records k 2 along with V 's identity in it's database. (c) V decrypts w 4 to obtain k i and k j . Thus, V can calculate y 1 and y 2 by multiplying a 1 and a 2 with g k i and h k j respectively. In addition, V also computes the signatures s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 by the following equations:
(d) V applies the ElGamal digital signature scheme to sign the voting content m. Let y 1 and y 2 be the public keys of the ElGamal Cryptosystem, and x 1 = r 1 + k i and x 2 = r 2 + k j be the corresponding private keys, such that y 1 = g x 1 mod p and y 2 = h x 2 mod p. V generates two signatures (a 1 , s 5 ) and (a 2 , s 6 ) of the voting content m by using the following equations:
Then the voting ticket can be computed as
Note that due to condition imposed on r 1 , r 2 , k i and k j , we are sure that x 
if one of these forms occurs in another thicket, double voting occurs and T CS can compute the value of k 2 corresponding to the malicious voter as follows:
in which |X| means that: |X| = X mod q if X < q/2 q − X mod q other wise Then, T CS can identify the malicious voter by cooperating with AS and searching AS's database to find out which voter is associated with the unique random number k 2 .
Analysis of the new scheme 3.2.1. Security analysis of the scheme
The problem of previous works is their multiplicative structure that causes them vulnerable to multiplicative attack which is presented in this paper. In our scheme by replacing multiplicative structure of the keys in the signatures by additive structure and choosing g and h by certificate authority, in a way that no one knows the discrete logarithm of them, we could make our scheme resistant against the first and second attacks on unforgeability of tickets.
Since k i and k j must be less than q/2 for all voters, by the help introducing the operation |X|, we can obtain the identity of malicious voters who employ the third attack on unforgeability of tickets. On the other hand in previous schemes the voter was trusted to choose exponent in his share of the keys in the prescribed manner. However malicious voter can choose exponents in such way that no authority can trace him if double voting occurs. In order to preclude this attack we allowed the voter to choose exponent as he desires and by introducing new key structure the perceptibility of double voting claimed in previous schemes satisfied. The other essential future of the e-voting is protecting anonymity of voters. In this paper it is showed that anonymity of voter can easily be removed without double voting. However in the new scheme by effectively blinding the signatures of AS and increasing the number of unknown parameters, the scheme is resistant against the proposed attacks.
Efficiency of the new scheme
By comparing number of multiplications and number of exponentiations we found that our scheme is more efficient than Hwang scheme. Table 2 expresses the comparison between our scheme and Hwang scheme. 
Schemes

Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the weaknesses of Hwang scheme in satisfying the properties of unforgeability of the tickets and perceptibility of double voter and anonymity of voters. We mentioned the applicability of these attacks on other scheme in the generation of Mu-Varadharajan protocols. Furthermore we proposed a new scheme and showed that this scheme beside the resistance against the attack which have been proposed until now, satisfy the anonymity and unforgeability of the thicket.
